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require	 legal	residence	as	 the	price	of	admission).3	 	But	 it	creates	the	potential	 for	broad	
public	 conversation—as	 has	 never	 before	 occurred	 in	 the	 United	 States—regarding	 the	



















Nonetheless,	 the	 debate	 that	 has	 accompanied	 PPACA’s	 adoption	 is	 about	 something	






the	 internal	 operations	of	 the	health	 care	universe	 are	 seldom	 thought	 of	 as	political,	 its	
 
4 I	do	not	mean	to	diminish	the	importance	of	PPACA’s	expansions	of	Medicare	and	especially	Medicaid.	 	 I	do	not	discuss	
them	in	this	article	because	they	are	extensions	of	existing	programs,	and	I	focus	here	on	PPACA’s	role	in	the	creation	of	new	in‐
stitutions	and	norms.	
5 Habermas	used	 the	 term	 “lifeworld”	 to	describe	major	domains	of	 social	 and	 individual	 life,	 such	as	 the	market	or	 the	









cial	welfare	 programs	 that	 incorporate	 both	 benefits	 and	 reciprocal	 obligations	 provide	
individuals	with	an	“operational	definition	of	citizenship.”7	








ther	 than	metaphorical,	 citizenship,	belonging	 in	 the	reformed	health	care	system	will	be	
defined	in	part	by	those	who	are	not	permitted	to	belong,	and	rights	will	be	defined	in	part	






The	debates	 about	PPACA	 illustrate	 that	 constitutional	 concepts	 are	 intertwined	with	
narrative	understandings	of	 government	authority	 and	 individual	 rights	 and	duties.	 	The	
trope	of	the	“living	Constitution,”	for	example,	began	with	Franklin	Roosevelt,	who	asserted	
that	we	have	a	 “living	Constitution”	as	part	of	his	argument	 that	 the	Depression	necessi‐
tated	a	more	capacious	scope	 for	executive	branch	authority.9	 	More	recently,	 the	phrase	
has	figured	prominently	in	debates	over	originalism	and	has	been	invoked	as	an	interpre‐











10 The	 phrase	 “living	 Constitution”	 has	 been	 used	 with	 distaste	 by	 some—and	 admiration	 by	 others—to	 describe	
rights‐enhancing	models	of	 constitutional	 interpretation.	Compare	Robert	H.	Bork,	Neutral	Principles	 and	Some	First	Amend‐
ment	Problems,	47	Ind.	L.J.	1,	1	(1971)	(calling	“deplorable”	the	fact	that	“the	nature	of	the	Constitution	will	change,	often	quite	
dramatically,	as	the	personnel	of	the	Supreme	Court	changes”),	and	William	H.	Rehnquist,	The	Notion	of	a	Living	Constitution,	54	














PPACA	creates	new	 institutions	will	 shape	 the	actions	of	 individuals	 interacting	with	 the	
health	system,	including	their	participation	in	various,	usually	localized	institutions	of	go‐
vernance.	These	new	regularized	practices	have	the	potential	to	lead	to	new	discourses	and	
understandings	 about	 the	 interrelationship	 between	 individualism	 and	 collectivity,	 and	




of	 Americans	must	 either	 purchase	 health	 insurance	 or	 pay	 a	 penalty.12	 	 The	 individual	
























Part	 II	 turns	 to	 the	 specific	 example	 of	 PPACA	 and	 examines	 both	 the	 structural	 and	





















tices	 as	 referring	 to	 regularized	behaviors	 and	 interactions	with	 a	 system	of	 governance	
and	 a	 coherent	 (although	 not	 necessarily	 universal)	 set	 of	 beliefs	 about	 the	meaning	 of	
those	behaviors.		I	then	examine	specific	and	concrete	governance	issues	that	must	be	ad‐













identification	and	pricing	of	 risk,	 financed	and	subsidized	by	public	 funds,	effectively	 im‐

























In	doing	so,	 I	 apply	 insights	 from	non‐legal	 scholarship	about	 the	 interrelationship	of	
economic‐political	notions	of	 citizenship	and	 the	 socio‐political	 role	of	 consumers.	 	What	
political	scientists	have	labeled	as	a	right	of	participation	in	the	private	sector	has	histori‐





























citizenship	 as	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	 dates	 from	 the	 liberal	 tradition	 that	 fueled	 the	

















sponsible	 to	 other	 members	 of	 the	 community.”28	 	 Despite	 the	 conventional	 pairing	 of	
rights	and	duties,	there	has	been	significantly	less	elaboration	of	the	responsibility	branch	
than	of	the	rights	branch,	either	in	political	theory29	or	in	constitutional	law	or	scholarship.		




Beginning	 at	 the	 core,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 upheld	 congressional	 authority	 under	 Ar‐

































ries,	 which	 in	 turn	 cites	 Roman	 law,	 the	 Court	 justified	 the	 affirmative	 duty	 as	 a	





















cases.	 	 Courts	 have	 upheld	 truancy	 laws	 that	 punished	 parents	 who	 did	 not	 send	 their	
children	 to	 school	 on	 the	 understanding	 that	 public	 schools	 were	 “not	 so	 much	 a	 right	






have	 used	 this	 lack	 of	 clarity	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 narrowest	 understanding	 of	 citizenship	
norms.		The	word	“draft”	recurs	in	the	debates	over	the	individual	mandate,42	for	example,	










so	 it	can	regulate	him	under	the	Commerce	Clause.”	 	David	M.	Drucker,	Virginia	 Judge	Allows	Health	Care	Challenge	to	Pro‐





indisputable	obligations	of	citizenship.	 	As	 the	Cato	Institute	argued	 in	 its	amicus	brief	 in	
the	Virginia	case,	“To	be	sure,	there	are	exceptional	situations	in	which	the	federal	govern‐
ment	may	mandate	individual	activity	.	.	.	[for	example,	the	draft,	jury	duty,	and	payment	of	
income	tax].	 	But	 these	duties	go	to	the	heart	of	American	citizenship.”43	 	Similarly,	 three	
former	Attorneys	General	of	the	United	States	argued	in	the	same	case	that	“the	broad	po‐




























ernment,	not	 in	 the	employment	 context	but	 in	 the	potential	 for	 the	 role	of	 consumer	 to	
overlap	with	that	of	citizen.		The	border	between	being	a	citizen	and	being	a	consumer	is	es‐


















Government	 officials	 during	 the	 Roosevelt	 administration	 sought	 both	 to	 strengthen	
and	 to	draw	strength	 from	national	consumer	organizations,	declaring	 that	a	governance	
role	 for	 consumers	would	 “put	 the	market	power	of	 the	 consumer	 to	work	politically.”50		
Presidential	speeches	validated	the	right	of	consumers	“to	have	their	interests	represented	
in	the	formulation	of	government	policy.”51		Formal	bodies	for	direct	consumer	representa‐
tion	 were	 established	 within	 the	 National	 Recovery	 Administration	 (NRA),	 the	 Office	 of	
Price	Administration	(OPA)	(during	World	War	II),	the	Tennessee	Valley	Authority,	and	the	
Rural	 Electrification	Administration.52	 	 Both	 the	NRA	 and	 the	OPA	 set	 up	 state	 and	 local	
consumer	 advisory	 groups	 as	well.53	 	 This	 focus	 on	 active	 participation	 built	 on	 and	 ex‐
panded	 the	 notion	 of	 consumer	 politics	 developed	 during	 the	 Progressive	 Era,	when	 re‐
 













litically	 “acceptable	way	of	promoting	 the	public	good”	without	 invoking	overtly	 socialist	
rhetoric,	 and	 as	 a	 tactic	 for	melding	 democratic	 values	with	 the	 preservation	 of	 capital‐
ism.55		Both	of	these	objectives	resonate	with	the	political	history	of	PPACA	as	well.		What	
Tom	Baker	describes	elsewhere	in	this	volume	as	the	trade‐off	in	PPACA	between	social	so‐



























only	a	 thin	 form	of	 “contractualized”	 citizenship.58	 	This	kind	of	 link	between	 citizenship	
and	consumer	activities	points	 to	an	understanding	of	 governance	as	 stakeholder	plural‐
ism,	 rather	 than	as	a	 reinforcement	of	 social	 solidarity	norms.	 	Consistent	with	 that	 con‐
cern,	the	normative	values	associated	with	a	contract‐based	understanding	of	citizenship	in	
the	 health	 care	 system	 speak	 less	 to	 social	 solidarity	 than	 to	 the	 individual’s	 capacity	 to	
identify	 and	 purchase	 coverage	 that	will	most	 closely	match	 her	 cost	 and	 quality	 prefe‐
rences.59	

























stitutionality	of	 its	 financing	component,	which,	unlike	 the	 individual	mandate	 in	PPACA,	
was	 clearly	 structured	 as	 a	 tax.64	 	 The	Court	 found	 the	 Social	 Security	Act	 constitutional	






to	 the	needy.	 	 See	Suzanne	Mettler,	Dividing	Citizens:	 	Gender	and	Federalism	 in	New	Deal	Public	Policy	55‐59	 (1998)	











































 Spreading	 from	 State	 to	 State,	 unemployment	 is	 an	 ill	 not	 particular	 but	 general,	
which	 may	 be	 checked,	 if	 Congress	 so	 determines,	 by	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 Na‐
tion	.	.	.	.	[Nation‐wide	harm	 results	 regardless	 of]	whether	men	 are	 thrown	out	 of	
work	because	there	is	no	longer	work	to	do	or	because	the	disabilities	of	age	make	
them	incapable	of	doing	it.		Rescue	becomes	necessary	irrespective	of	the	cause.70	
These	passages	 in	Helvering	performed	significant	work	 in	 the	Social	 Security	debate	
and	are	extraordinarily	rich	for	present	purposes	as	well.		The	Court	invokes	the	norms	of	
reciprocal	and	collective	responsibility—“rescue”—that	comprise	the	ethos	of	citizenship.		







reasonable	 expectation	 of	 the	 obligations	 of		















phenomenon	 in	 which	 low‐income	 beneficiaries	 have	 become	 more	 active	 than	
high‐income	seniors	on	issues	specific	to	Social	Security.76	
Engagement	by	participants	has	 led,	 in	 turn,	 to	modifications	 that	have	expanded	 the	
scope	of	the	program.77		Social	Security	created	an	identifiable	constituency	group	that	at‐
tracted	 interest‐group	entrepreneurs	and	political	parties,	who	 in	 turn	mobilized	greater	
levels	 of	 engagement	 by	 program	 enrollees,	who	 themselves	 identified	 gaps	 in	 coverage	





































the	health	 insurance	market:	 	prohibitive	cost	 (with	premiums	 increasing	at	a	 faster	rate	
than	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 in	 income)	 and	 decreasing	 participation	 (forty‐six	million	 unin‐
sured	in	2007,	with	one	in	four	households	forgoing	necessary	medical	care	due	to	cost).81		
Expanding	 access	 to	 coverage	 required	 reforming	 two	profit‐boosting	 strategies	 that	 un‐










81 Id.	82 See	Health	Reform	 in	 the	21st	Century:	 	 Insurance	Market	Reforms:	 	Hearing	Before	 the	H.	Comm.	on	Ways	and	Means,	
111th	Cong.	13	(2009)	(statement	of	Uwe	E.	Reinhardt,	Professor,	Princeton	University)	(noting	that	health	care	will	never	be	avail‐
able	 to	 “all	Americans	on	equal	 terms”	as	 long	as	 insurance	companies	practiced	underwriting,	and	advocating	community‐rated	




Discrimination	based	on	pre‐existing	 conditions	 (e.g.,	 denying	or	 rescinding	 coverage	
for	 health	 conditions	 pre‐dating	 policy	 enrollment)	 had	 shut	 off	 access	 to	 insurance	 for	
many	patients	 in	 immediate	need	of	 care.	 	To	 facilitate	coverage	of	high‐cost	health	 care	
services,	Congress	required	insurers	to	offer	guaranteed	issue	and	guaranteed	renewal	of	
coverage,	and	limited	insurers’	ability	to	mask	unexpected	exclusions	of	coverage	in	cum‐
bersome	 contracts.84	 In	 addition,	 Congress	 required	 coverage	 of	 “essential	 benefits,”	 and	


























State‐based	 reforms	had	demonstrated	 this	effect.	 	 For	example,	Congress	 considered	
the	 experience	 of	 New	 Jersey’s	 Individual	 Health	 Coverage	 Program	 of	 1993,	 which	 re‐






to	 the	New	 Jersey	experience,	health	 reform	 in	Massachusetts	demonstrated	 the	stability	
that	an	 individual	mandate	 can	bring	 to	 risk	pooling.	 	Within	 three	years	of	 imposing	 its	








88 See	 Monheit	 et	 al.,	 supra	 note	 87,	 at	 169	 (describing	 a	 trend	 of	 enrollment	 consistent	 with	 “a	 marketwide	 ad‐
verse‐selection	death	spiral”).		
89 See	id.	(noting	that	insurers	have	been	forced	to	retain	“potentially	adverse	health	risks”).	90 Sharon	K.	Long	&	Karen	Stockley,	Health	Reform	in	Massachusetts:	 	An	Update	as	of	Fall	2009,	at	iii	(2010);	see	
also	PPACA	§	10106(a),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18091(a)(2)(D)	(West	Supp.	1B	2010)	(describing	the	“Effects	on	the	National	Economy	and	
Interstate	Commerce”	of	 the	 individual	mandate	and	stating	 that	 “[i]n	Massachusetts,	a	 similar	 requirement	has	strengthened	
private	employer‐based	coverage:		despite	the	economic	downturn,	the	number	of	workers	offered	employer‐based	coverage	has	
actually	increased.”).			
 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 experience	 of	 state‐based	 insurance	 reform,	 Congress	 used	 a	





Congress	 also	 found	 the	mandate	 important	 for	 addressing	 issues	 related	 to	 employ‐
er‐sponsored	coverage:	 	continuity	in	coverage	and	variability	in	plans.	 	In	light	of	the	in‐
crease	 in	 lateral	career	movement,	Congress	concluded	that	a	mandate	would	 incentivize	
employees	to	remain	covered	during	the	transition	between	old	and	new	employer	plans.94		
It	would	also	enhance	the	accessibility	of	coverage	for	the	self‐employed,	unemployed,	or	
underemployed,	 or	 those	 working	 in	 small	 businesses	 that	 lack	 risk‐pooling	 capacity.95		
PPACA	creates	state‐based	health	insurance	exchanges	in	order	to	provide	a	vehicle	for	ob‐


















Lawsuits	 challenging	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 PPACA	 have	 targeted	 the	 individual	
mandate.98		The	resolution	of	these	claims,	almost	certainly	by	the	Supreme	Court,	will	turn	





















99 See	McCollum,	 716	F.	 Supp.	 2d	 at	 1164	 (quoting	 a	 1994	CBO	memorandum	determining	 that	 the	 individual	mandate	
would	be	“an	unprecedented	form	of	federal	action”);	see	generally	Jennifer	Staman,	Cong.	Research	Serv.,	R40725,	Requiring	

























services	 if	 and	 as	 needed.”101	 	 In	 Thomas	More	 Law	Center	 v.	 Obama,	 the	District	 Court	
found	that	the	individual	plaintiffs	had	standing	because	of	the	present	injury	of	




the	 contention	 that	 the	 Individual	 Mandate	 is	 causing	 plaintiffs	 to	 feel	 economic	
pressure	today.102	
These	assertions	 recall	 two	cases	decided	by	 the	Supreme	Court	 slightly	more	 than	a	
century	ago	which	also	concerned	the	legitimacy	of	a	health‐related	mandate	grounded	in	
social	 welfare	 policy.	 	 In		
Jacobson	 v.	 Massachusetts,	 the	 Court	 upheld	 a	 requirement	 that	 every	 resident	 of	 Cam‐
bridge,	Massachusetts,	be	vaccinated	 for	smallpox,	 rejecting	 the	argument	 that	 it	violated	
bodily	liberty.103		Less	than	two	months	later,	in	Lochner	v.	New	York,	the	Court	upheld	the	
primacy	of	economic	liberty	and	the	right	of	contract	by	invalidating	a	law	that	set	a	maxi‐















sary,	 literally,	 for	community	survival,	a	 linkage	that	made	sense	in	the	context	of	an	epi‐
demic	 of	 infectious	 disease	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 last	 century:105	 	 “Upon	 the	 principle	 of	
self‐defense,	of	paramount	necessity,	a	community	has	the	right	to	protect	itself	against	an	
epidemic	 of	 disease	 which	 threatens	 the	 safety	 of	 its	 members.”106	 	 The	 Court	 also	 de‐
scribed	the	individual’s	duty	as	part	of	a	social	compact	with	the	state:	
There	are	manifold	 restraints	 to	which	every	person	 is	necessarily	 subject	 for	 the	
common	 good	.	.	.	.	 This	 court	 has	more	 than	 once	 recognized	 it	 as	 a	 fundamental	









































arriving	 on	 a	 flight	 from	New	York	 to	 Los	 Angeles	would	much	 care	whether	 federal	 or	
state	health	authorities	ordered	the	quarantine,113	I	doubt	that	the	final	ruling	on	the	con‐
stitutionality	 of	 the	 individual	 mandate	 will	 be	 understood	 as	 resolving	 the	 question	 of	
which	level	of	government	has	the	power	to	force	an	individual	into	a	community‐rating	in‐
surance	 system.	 	 Rather,	 the	 popular	 understanding	 likely	 will	 center	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
whether	persons	can	be	compelled	by	any	level	of	government	to	participate	in	a	social	in‐
surance	compact	for	the	common	good,	or	whether,	when	the	rational	economic	choice	of	





mine	 only	whether	 there	 is	 a	 rational	 basis	 for	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 regulated	 activities	 substantially	 affect	 interstate	 com‐
merce).	112 Id.	at	893‐95	(explaining	Congress’s	rational	basis	for	passing	PPACA).	




In	 the	debates	over	 the	validity	of	PPACA	 that	occur	outside	 the	confines	of	 litigation	
briefs,	 these	broader	 themes	of	 social	meaning	dominate.	 	One	main	 strategy	of	PPACA’s	
opponents	has	been	to	persuade	legislatures	in	six	states	to	adopt	“health	insurance	free‐
dom”	 laws	 that	would	 prohibit	 any	 individual	mandate,	 state	 or	 federal.115	 	 In	 the	 2010	
election,	voters	in	Arizona	and	Oklahoma	amended	their	state	constitutions	to	add	the	lan‐
guage	of	“health	insurance	freedom.”116		The	primary	purpose	of	these	amendments	is	not	


























In	 this	Part,	 I	 argue	 for	using	a	 concept	of	 citizenship	practices	 to	understand	 the	so‐
cio‐legal	relationship	between	individuals	and	social	 insurance	programs.	 	As	I	use	 it,	 the	













stitutional	 rights);	Bill	O’Reilly,	Pinheads	and	Patriots:	 	Where	You	Stand	 in	 the	Age	of	Obama	 57‐60	 (2010)	 (describing	
PPACA	and	arguing	that	it	passed	only	because	of	political	maneuvering);	Michael	Savage,	Trickle	Up	Poverty	115‐53	(2010)	(dis‐
cussing	PPACA’s	shortcomings	 in	 language	aimed	at	a	 lay	audience);	Sally	C.	Pipes,	Repeal	 the	Individual	Mandate	of	Obamacare,	
HumanEvents.com	(Aug.	12,	2010),	http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38517	(describing	the	 individual	mandate	as	
“an	egregious	assualt	on	our	economic	liberty”);	The	Rush	Limbaugh	Show:		Battle	over	Obamacare	Repeal	Is	Essentially	a	De‐




ing	 a	multi‐dimensional,	 nontechnical,	 and	 normative	 concept	 of	 citizenship,	 rather	 than	
stretching	citizenship	as	a	metaphor	so	far	that	the	word	becomes	almost	meaningless.	
I	 intend	“citizenship	practices”	to	denote	both	concrete	activities	and	the	social	mean‐
ings	 associated	with	 citizenship.	 	 Specifically,	 I	mean	 it	 to	 denote	 the	 discourses,	 institu‐
tions,	and	statutory	programs	that	comprise	a	network	of	social	structures.	 	This	network	



























ble	 to	unbundle	health	 from	other	 issues.	 	Moreover,	 citizen	engagement	with	 respect	 to	
elections	is	low,	as	captured	by	Michael	Walzer’s	description	of	citizens	as	“spectators	who	
vote.”120	Exchange‐level	 entities,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 could	provide	more	 localized	oppor‐
tunities	for	developing	citizenship	skills	such	as	self‐governance	and	leadership,	as	well	as	
a	venue	 in	which	smaller	decisions	may	ultimately	shape	 larger	and	more	distant	policy‐







cilitate	an	allegiance	 to	norms	of	social	 insurance	on	the	part	of	 those	who	participate	 in	
them.	
Section	 1311	 of	 PPACA	 requires	 states	 to	 establish	 “American	 Health	 Benefit	 Ex‐
changes”	 by	 January	 1,	 2014.121	 	 PPACA	 distinguishes	 between	 exchanges	 for	 individual	
purchasers	of	health	insurance	and	exchanges	for	small	businesses	seeking	to	find	coverage	
for	 their	 employees	 (the	 “Small	Business	Health	Options	Program”),	 and	 allows	 states	 to	











exchange	 in	 place	 by	 2014,	 the	 Secretary	 will	 establish	 and	 operate	 an	 exchange	 in	 that	 state.	 	 Id.	 §	 1321(c),	 42	 U.S.C.A.	 §	
18041(c).							122 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(b)(1)–(2).	
123 Id.,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(f)(1).	 	New	Mexico,	 for	example,	 interprets	 the	benefits	of	a	 regional	exchange	 to	 include	 in‐
creased	long‐run	efficiencies	and	expanded	portability	for	residents.		New	Mexico	Human	Servs.	Dep’t,	Implementing	Federal	
Health	Care	Reform—A	Roadmap	for	New	Mexico	26	(2010).	124 See	PPACA	§	1321(c)	(authorizing	 the	U.S.	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	 to	establish	exchanges	 in	non‐
compliant	states	after	January	1,	2013).		125 Id.	§	1311,	42	U.S.C.A.	§	18031(d)(4).	









have	a	great	deal	of	discretion	 to	exercise	 in	a	 short	window	of	 time.128	 	The	most	 likely	
models	exist	in	Massachusetts,	Utah,	and	states	that,	like	California,	were	among	the	earli‐
est	to	create	exchanges.129		In	2006,	when	Massachusetts	imposed	its	own	mandate	on	state	
residents,	 it	 created	 the	 Commonwealth	 Health	 Insurance	 Connector	 to	 help	 individuals	
purchase	affordable	coverage.130		The	Massachusetts	Connector	provided	a	template	for	the	
exchange	system	established	in	PPACA.131		Utah	created	a	similar	exchange	in	2009,132	and	
California	 enacted	 legislation	 in	 2010	 creating	 the	 California	Health	 Benefit	 Exchange.133		
These	three	models	are	 likely	 to	guide	other	states	as	 they	make	decisions	regarding	 im‐
portant	 governance	 issues	 in	 the	 process	 of	 creating	 PPACA	 compliant	 exchanges.	 	 Two	
 




State	Coverage	 Initiatives,	Health	 Insurance	Exchanges:	 	Key	 Issues	 for	 State	 Implementation	 2‐3	 (2010),	 available	 at	
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70388.pdf	 (describing	why	 states	will	 likely	prefer	 to	 create	 their	own	exchanges,	 rather	
than	be	subject	to	a	federally	run	exchange).		In	addition,	the	New	Mexico	Human	Services	Department	has	noted	that	“ambitious	














States	must	 determine	 how	much	 oversight	 they	will	 exercise	 over	 health	 insurance	
plans	 offered	 through	 their	 exchanges.	 	 PPACA	 restricts	 entry	 to	 the	 exchange	 to	 those	





Some	 states	 may	 follow	 the	 Utah	 Health	 Exchange	 model,	 and	 provide	 a	 “clearing‐
house”	of	health	insurance	plans	that	meet	the	federal	minimum	standards.137		This	mod‐








Initiatives,	 Preparing	 for	 Health	 Reform:	 	 The	 Role	 of	 the	 Health	 Insurance	 Exchange	 4‐5	 (2010),	 available	 at	
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/57093.pdf	 (describing	 how	 the	 exchange	 acts	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information	 about	 available	
plans,	provides	structure	to	the	market,	and	serves	as	a	broker	by	handling	billing	and	collection).	
 value	 for	 their	 health	 care	 dollars	 by	 not	 imposing		
further	requirements.	





with	 plans	 to	 create	 a	market	 of	 “optimal	 combination	 of	 choice,	 value,	 quality,	 and	 ser‐
vice,”141	 limiting	participation	to	 those	plans	offering	 five	tiers	of	coverage	(ranging	 from	
catastrophic‐only	 to	platinum	coverage)	both	on	and	off	of	 the	exchange.142	 	Other	states	
struggling	with	rising	health	care	costs	may	find	this	selective	contracting	option	attractive,	
as	it	will	allow	regulators	to	best	control	premium	growth.143	




























Second,	 the	 law	requires	each	state	 to	create	an	exchange	as	either	a	 “governmental	
agency	or	nonprofit	entity	.	.	.	established	by	a	State,”147	meaning	that	a	state	that	does	not	
utilize	 the	 federally	 run	 exchange	 must	 house	 an	 exchange	 within	 the	 government	 or	




















ernment	 entity.152	 	 However,	 despite	 ease	 of	 communications	with	 related	 entities,	 state	
bureaucracy	 and	political	 considerations	may	 slow	or	 complicate	decisionmaking,	 hiring,	
and	 contracting.153	 	 Creating	 an	 independent	 or	 quasigovernmental	 public	 agency—or	 a	
nonprofit	organization—could	alleviate	some	of	these	concerns	by	uncoupling	these	func‐














153 Cf.	id.	(discussing	the	need	to	make	the	exchange’s	structure	“nimble”).	154 See	Families	USA,	Implementing	Health	Insurance	Exchanges:	 	Options	for	Governance	and	Oversight	5‐6	(2011),	
available	 at	 http://familiesusa2.org/assets/	




















setts,	 California,	 and	Connecticut—have	or	 are	planning	 to	 create	 a	new	state	 agency,	 and	
will	 appoint	 a	 small	 governing	 board	 (e.g.,	 five	 to	 ten	 people)	 that	 includes	 individuals	
representing	 the	expertise	 the	exchanges	will	demand	(such	as	economists,	actuaries,	plan	
benefit	specialists,	and	health	policy	experts)	along	with	representatives	from	interested	par‐










































participation	 in	 the	 structuring	of	 exchanges	and	 regulations,	 thereby	augmenting	public	
acceptance	of	a	changing	health	care	market.	
a.		Providing	Consumer	Information	
PPACA	 requires	 exchanges	 to	 facilitate	 easy	 comparisons	 of	 plan	 benefits,	 costs,	 and	
policies,	seeking	to	maximize	competition	among	participating	plans.		More	specifically,	the	































In	 addition	 to	 providing	 easily	 accessible	 information,	 PPACA	 requires	 states	 to	 take	
steps	to	reach	out	to	those	least	likely	to	use	the	exchange.		While	employed	individuals	will	
receive	 notice	 of	 an	 available	 exchange	 from	 an	 employer,175	 the	 state	 must	 target	










it	 also	 requires	 that	 the	 summary	 direct	 the	 consumer	 to	 the	 plan	 itself	 to	 determine	 contractual	 details.	 	 Id.	 sec.	 1001,	 §§	
2715(a),	(b)(3),	42	U.S.C.A.	§	300gg‐15	(West	Supp.	1A	2010);	see	also	Jost,	supra	note	97,	at	32‐34	(discussing	the	“accurately	
describe”	requirement	and	arguing	that	these	descriptions	should	be	legally	binding).	





ployee’s	potential	eligibility	 for	a	premium	assistance	 tax	credit	and/or	cost	sharing	reduction,	as	well	as	 the	potential	 loss	of	








example,	 in	 New	 York,	 community‐based	 organizations,	 consumer	 assistance	 programs,	



















taken	 the	 lead	 in	 engaging	 the	 public,	 holding	weekly	 “office	 hours”	with	 the	 director	 of	
health‐reform	 implementation	 and	organizing	150	outreach	 activities—including	 forums,	
conferences,	and	press	conferences—since	April	2010.181	 	Other	states	have	focused	their	
efforts	 to	 engage	 stakeholders	 on	 soliciting	 the	 opinions	 of	 varying	 interest	 groups	 by	
creating	 diverse	 advisory	 boards,	 rather	 than	 opening	 the	 floor	 to	 the	 greater	 public.182		
Whether	 the	 latter	approach	will	 constitute	adequate	 “stakeholder	 involvement”	 remains	
to	be	seen—to	date,	interim	guidance	issued	by	the	Office	of	Consumer	Information	and	In‐
surance	 Oversight	 (OCIIO)	 has	 been	 limited.	 	 OCIIO’s	 “Initial	 Guidance	 to	 States	 on	 Ex‐
changes”	mentions	the	importance	of	public	involvement	in	setting	up	the	exchanges,	stat‐
ing	that	“[s]uccessful	exchanges	will	work	closely	with	consumer	advocates,”	among	other	
stakeholders.183	 	Further	regulatory	guidance	on	the	types	of	stakeholders	to	 involve,	 the	
degree	of	 involvement,	or	 the	responsiveness	of	 the	exchange	to	public	comment	has	not	














plan	 ratings	 will	 be	 based	 in	 part	 on	 an	 “enrollee	 satisfaction	 survey	 system”	 that	 §	
1311(c)(4)	 requires	 the	Secretary	 to	establish.185	 	This	 survey	 system,	modeled	after	 the	
system	 in	place	 for	 the	Federal	Employee	Health	Benefit	Program,186	and,	 similar	 to	con‐


















 fective	 citizenship	practices	 is	 actually	enhanced	under	PPACA.189	 	 Its	 construction	as	a	
private	market‐based	social	insurance	system	with	multiple	risk	pools,	for	example,	posi‐
tions	it	differently	than	Social	Security.		Campbell	found	that	the	uniformity	of	rules	in	So‐
cial	 Security	 signals	 that	 each	 person’s	 participation	 is	 equally	 legitimate,	 which	 in	 turn	
produces	more	such	activity.190		PPACA	is	neither	entirely	uniform	the	way	Social	Security	
is	nor	is	it	a	fully	means‐tested	program	like	Medicaid.191	
There	 is	 ample	 authority	 in	PPACA	 for	policymaking	 that	would	 enhance	participatory	




















virtually	 certain	 to	 realize	 some	 significant	 benefits	 over	 time.	 	 In	 such	 a	 system,	 formal	
constraints	are	necessary	to	prevent	free‐rider	problems.	 	Other	mutual	financial	benefits	
include	protection	against	wasteful	use	of	public	funds	to	compensate	providers	for	treat‐
ments	 furnished	 to	 the	uninsured	 and	 the	 reduction	of	 transaction	 costs	 in	providing	 all	
medical	treatments.	
There	 is	 also	 mutual	 benefit	 in	 the	 spillover	 of	 positive	 externalities	that	 accrue	 to	
population	health	and	thus	 to	participants	collectively.		Public	health	studies	have	shown	
that	insurance	status	is	positively	correlated	with	improved	health	outcomes	for	individu‐
als.192	Economic	analyses	suggest	that	 increasing	health	 insurance	coverage	 in	the	United	
States	would	result	in	large	national‐level	socio‐economic	gains.193		In	addition,	recent	out‐
breaks	 of	 infectious	 diseases,	 often	 on	 a	 global	 scale,	 indicate	 that	 removing	 barriers	 to	














































reform	 proposal	 advanced	 by	 President	 Clinton197:	 	 What	 have	 we	 created	 by	 enacting	
PPACA?		It’s	a	health	security	system,	if	you	can	keep	it.	
	
 
195 See	supra	note	98	(citing	cases	challenging	PPACA).	
196 Franklin	engaged	in	the	following	exchange	after	the	conclusion	of	the	Constitutional	Convention:		“‘Well,	Doctor,	what	
have	we	got—a	Republic	or	a	Monarchy?’		‘A	Republic,	if	you	can	keep	it.’”		Respectfully	Quoted:		A	Dictionary	of	Quotations	
from	the	Library	of	Congress	299	(Suzy	Platt	ed.,	1992).	
197 See	American	Health	Security	Act	of	1993,	H.R.	1200,	103d	Cong.	§	101	(1993)	(“establish[ing]	.	.	.	a	State‐Based	American	
Health	Security	Program”	(emphasis	added)).	
